By Vineet Thakur
Sourced from the website The Wire
“Based on a document dated 1949 found in the South African National Archives by the author, Dr Vineet Thakur.”
‘Private and secret’ memo in the South African diplomatic
archives reveals an astonishing proposal that India made in 1949.
 |
| Indian settlers in South Africa. Credit: Wikimedia Commons |
 |
| Indian settlers in South Africa. Credit: Wikimedia Commons |
On October 24, 1949, South Africa’s representative at the
UN, G.P. Jooste, sent a ‘private and secret’ memorandum to his headquarters in
Pretoria. The opening paragraph of the memo read: “I have to inform you that shortly after my minute of
September 23rd, Sir Benegal [Narising Rau] saw us and explained that his
government had authorised this [meeting], at his own request, to discuss the matter
with us on a non-committal informal basis. He therefore suggested exploratory
conversations.”
My eyes lit up as I scanned through this document at the
National Archives in Pretoria. Until then, most books on India-South Africa
relations (there aren’t too many) that detail these early years of independence
had given me, page after page, a story of massive confrontation – almost
mythical in proportion – between India and South Africa in the late-1940s at
the UN. So quite naturally, an informal dinner meeting between two top UN
diplomats of countries that were at each other’s throats excited me. But as I
read on, the excitement turned into bewilderment for Rau had proposed a
casteist solution to a racist problem, alerting me to an issue that has been almost
singularly stripped from any narratives of Indian foreign policy – caste.
One of the reasons B.R. Ambedkar had cited in his
resignation from Jawaharlal Nehru’s cabinet in October 1951 was his exclusion
from decision making on foreign policy. In the first couple of decades of
India’s independence, the Indian foreign service (IFS) was the most elite of
all civil services (which, as a joke went, suffered from Menon-gitis). But
beyond the (Brahmin) men (in the first 10 years of recruitment into the IFS, only
three out of 62 selections were women), how did casteist ideas filter into
foreign policy discourse? In general, what role do caste dynamics play in the
formulation of foreign policy? We have never known, because foreign policy as a
matter of ‘national interest’ is deemed above domestic squabbles, such as
caste. Yet, the fact is, diplomacy is carried out by diplomats, and their
social milieu influences not only their views about what constitutes ‘national
interest’, but also who constitutes the ‘nation’. No study has ever been done
on this, but perhaps this document will prove a valuable entry point.
Let us return to our tale then.
 |
| B.N. Rau. Credit: Photo Division, Government of India |
A proposal for
caste-based segregation
Less than three years earlier, from October to December
1946, the Indian delegation to the UN, led by Vijayalakshmi Pandit, had carried
out a diplomatic David vs Goliath with perhaps the most respected statesman of
the world then – Jan Smuts. The man who had “inserted human rights” into the
preamble of the UN Charter left New York with “the honour, the power and the
glory, all vanished,” wrote a sympathetic biographer, due to an “avalanche of
condemnation” heaped on him by the Indian delegation on the question of human
rights. Most prominent of these was Pandit herself, who called Smuts out for
his hypocrisy on the treatment of Indians in South Africa.
On December 8, soon after an impassioned speech from Pandit,
who, with a tear rolling down her eye, had appealed to “the conscience of the
World Assembly,” India secured a two-thirds majority on its resolution against
South Africa. India’s diplomatic assault had left Smuts to rue: “I am suspected
of being a hypocrite because I can be quoted on both sides”. By sheer force of
conviction, India had placed the issue of racism on the UN agenda.
By late-1949, through a continued strategy of shaming South
Africa at the UN, India had been able to secure a preliminary roundtable for
talks with Pretoria. Perhaps to create a positive environment for talks, in
September 1949 Rau deliberately used a milder tone in his opening statement on
South Africa’s treatment of Indians, and let his counterpart, Jooste, know that
his statement “may be regarded as a compromise”. A former Indian civil servant
who also played a key role in drafting India’s constitution, Rau was India’s
permanent representative to the UN. Known as ‘the saint of the United Nations’,
he along with Nasrollah Entezam of Iran and Lester Pearson of Canada, formed
the ‘Three Wise Men’ group at the UN in those early years. Under Rau, the
Indian delegation was once described by Alastair Cooke as “messengers of peace
casting sweetness and light around” in The Times.
Rau sought Jooste out for an informal dinner meeting, at the
behest of the Indian government, and Jooste was told by Pretoria “to be most
careful literally to say more or less what is proposed”.
In the meeting, Jooste, accompanied by his deputy J. Jordaan,
kept to his brief, detailing South Africa’s position on the issue. Rau,
however, let his tongue fly. Showing a rather “unexpected measure of
frankness,” Rau began with confessing, Jooste noted, that ‘the feverish
attempts in his country to destroy all caste inequalities were resulting in
what in actual practice amounted to discrimination against the erstwhile ruling
castes such as the Brahmins, to which he belongs’.
Interestingly, this
confession came just over a month before the pro-caste equality draft of the
Indian constitution was introduced in the constituent assembly. In introducing
the draft constitution, ironically, Ambedkar went on to specially credit Rau
for his sterling work in preparing the draft.
Going further, Rau stated that “Indians who went to South
Africa did not belong to the best type
and that, as in Burma, they may have exploited the local population and
given India a bad name”. He added that the way the South African government
treated them “might be fully justified and that in fact India would not mind
discrimination against our local Indian community if only it was not based on
racial lines”.
In his earlier discussions with Canadian authorities, Rau
stated, he had proposed that Canada should allow “a small group of select
nationals, say 20, to migrate to Canada where after a period of time they would
be granted full rights of citizenship”. (Indian diplomats had indeed made such
a suggestion to the Canadians, but the figure was 200) Based on this precedent,
Rau enquired whether a similar proposal of citizenship to “a small number, say
10, of the cultured and best type of Indians” could work for South Africa “as a
token to the world that the racial equality of Indians was recognised” by that
country.
The Jooste Memorandum
It is clear from the contextual reference to Rau’s lament
about “discrimination against erstwhile ruling castes like Brahmins” that his
euphemistic reference to Indians of the
“best type” was really a proxy for the upper castes.
Effectively, what Rau had proposed was that if a small
number of upper caste Indians were admitted as equal citizens in South Africa,
this would in principle mean that there was no racial discrimination against
Indians and give South Africa a way out in rechristening racism as a form of
minority protection. Rau’s argument was based on the premise that upper caste
Indians constituted the Indian nation in its best form, and thus only they were
its true representatives. Lower caste Indians were, in short, not Indian
enough, and hence how they were treated did not matter.
Rau assured Jooste that as soon as South Africa did anything
to “remove discrimination based on racial considerations,” India would end its
opposition to the country. He further added that India was acting as a “bulwark
… against Communism in the East” and had taken a leadership position, and
hence, “could not accept the position of being the inferior race,” and the
South African application of the racial criteria was “playing into the hands of
the communists who, today, were representing themselves as the liberators of
the oppressed and the champions of freedom and liberty”.
The reaction from Pretoria to this memo was cautious. They
refused to entertain the idea of making caste-based, and not race-based,
distinctions. Ironically, year after year, it was apartheid South Africa that
highlighted, at the UN, India’s hypocrisy on racial issues by deeming casteism
as a form of racism.
Casteism in foreign
policy
So, how does a historian of India’s foreign policy read this
particular memo written by Jooste?
 |
| Indians in South Africa. Credit: Wikimedia Commons |
One standard requirement would be to find out what Rau had
to say about this conversation in his missives to Nehru or the Ministry of
External Affairs. Such a letter doesn’t exist in Rau’s papers at the Nehru
Memorial Museum Library, neither can one find anything in the National
Archives. Short of conclusive proof, we are forced to ask the next best
question: how much does one trust the authenticity of another person’s account?
If it is a ‘private and secret’ memo of an external affairs department that is
crucial in formulating foreign policy, there is a strong case for believing
that this conversation actually happened in this form.
Or perhaps Rau was bluffing the South Africans to get a
desired deal. We would never know for sure, although such a proposal of entry
of just 10 Indians would almost certainly not work, given the strong struggle
South African Indians were then waging within that country. Rau, though, had
either misquoted or purposely brought down the numbers in the Canadian case
from 200 to 20, possibly to make it more acceptable to South Africans.
The ‘small number’ argument had, in fact, also been used by
Gandhi in his struggles in South Africa where he had asked for six Indians to
be allowed to enter the Transvaal district, as an in principle acceptance of
Indians as racially equals to Europeans. But Rau’s emphasis on ‘select
nationals’ chosen from the ‘best type’ clearly referred to allowing only upper
caste Indians, in order to sideline the racial argument. Although India’s
argument on racial discrimination at the UN was only limited to discrimination
faced by Indians – not Africans – in
South Arica until 1952, it was broadly justified by arguing that including
Africans would step on South Africa’s sovereignty and thus strategically weaken
India’s anti-racial struggle. But Rau’s suggestions, clearly, don’t help in
using that explanation either, since he believed that racial discrimination in
general could continue as long as it didn’t ‘look’ racial towards Indians.
This, of course, gives credence to the argument that India’s
anti-racism has always had limited sympathy with Africans, and thus is often
hypocritical. But Rau’s diplomacy reveals something more: that Indian diplomacy
has also, in ways subtler than stark, used casteist framings. And accordingly,
while caste has, justifiably, been scaled up as an issue of national
importance, recently its remnants need to be exposed even in the most sacred of
our institutions. Foreign policy is certainly one.
Vineet Thakur is a
postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Johannesburg.
